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Dubnoff: Does Gender Equality Always Imply Gender Blindness--The Status of

DOES GENDER EQUALITY ALWAYS IMPLY GENDER
BLINDNESS? THE STATUS OF SINGLE-SEX

EDUCATION FOR WOMEN
CAREN DUBNOFF*
INTRODUCTION

There were in 1980 more than 125,000 women attending single-sex colleges, and about one million alumnae.1 Enrollment in women's colleges expanded twenty-five percent from 1970 to 1980,2 and several schools continue
to report significant increases in enrollment.3 Clearly, the continued existence of these schools is an important issue for many women. Those who opposed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) often argued that ratification
4
would have hurt these women by mandating the end of single-sex schools.
This is not to say that all, or even most, women view an end to women's colleges as a negative development. Single-sex education is an issue which
divides many feminists. Some see the women's colleges as more committed to
the advancement of women than the coeducational institutions,5 while others
claim that single-sex education is detrimental to women.' Still others are ambivalent.' The legal commentary has not taken issue with the proposition that
sex segregation in public education would no longer be permissible if ERA
were ratified. This is apparently because most commentators accepted a view
advanced in one of the first and most comprehensive analyses of the amend* A.B., Bryn Mawr College; Ph.D., Columbia University. Associate Professor and Chairperson, Department of Political Science, College of the Holy Cross.
' Profile Il A Second Profile of Women's Colleges: Analysis of the Date, THE WOMEN'S COLLEGE COALITION, at 1 (Nov. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Profile 11].
2

Id.

I For example, from 1981 to 1982, applications to Bryn Mawr College increased by more than
12 percent; to Immaculata College by more than 30 percent; to Smith, Wellesley, Barnard and
Mount Holyoke by more than 10 percent. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 12, 1982 at lB.
Former Democratic Senator from North Carolina Sam J. Ervin's comments are a recent example. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1983 at A15. The same claim was made in a pamphlet circulated in
Connecticut by opponents of ERA. See Emerson & Lifton, Should the ERA Be Ratified?, 55
CONN. B.J. 227, 235 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Emerson].
I The President of Bryn Mawr College, Mary Patterson McPherson, identified the benefits
that women's colleges provided. "Many coeducational schools have admitted women as students
but not as full partners in the enterprise." The Daily Progress, (Charlottesville, Va.) Jan. 30, 1983
at Fl. For an extreme statement of how coeducational institutions fail women see Adrienne Rich's
comment, "The co-educational college mission statement that professes to 'develop the whole man'
probably does exactly that. This is no semantic game or trivial accident of language; what we have
at present is a man-centered university a breeding ground, not of humanism, but of masculine

privilege."

TOWARD A WOMAN'S CENTERED UNIVERSITY

(1979) (quoted in Brief for Mississippi Col-

lege for Women at 18, 19, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
' See L. BAKER, I'm RADCLIFFE! FLY ME! THE SEVEN SISTERS AND THE FAILURE OF WOMEN'S
EDUCATION (1976) [hereinafter cited as BAKER]; Comment, Plessy Revived The Separate But
Equal Doctrine and Sex-Segregated Education, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
I Goodman, A Judgment Against Women's Colleges? Washington Post, May 31, 1983 at A21.
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ment, that ERA would prohibit the use of all gender classifications. The
most that has been said to assuage those who support single-sex schools is
that the effect of ERA would be negligible since most remaining single-sex
schools are private.' This assertion is based on the fact that in a manner quite
similar to that of the fourteenth amendment, ERA by its language is a bar only to state action. It leaves private institutions to do as they will unless it can
be shown that, as a result of either the functions they perform or the close
ties they have to the government, their actions must be considered
equivalent to that of the state.
I am not convinced that the state/private distinction could or should
prevail in this context. As a political device to diffuse opposition to ERA, it
may have had some value. As a logical argument, it is flawed. It is no secret
that the government provides considerable financial assistance to such
schools, both directly through programatic aid and indirectly in the form of
tax exemptions and grants to students. When the verbage is stripped away,
what remains is the vulnerable position that what is impermissible for the
state to do directly is allowable for it to do indirectly. As a matter of law as
well, it is not so obvious that the policies of private colleges and universities
would be insulated from the force of the amendment."
It seems likely that ERA would place gender discrimination in a similar
category as racial discrimination. The position of private schools under the
fourteenth amendment should therefore provide some indication of how the
state/private distinction might be approached. Although the Supreme Court
has not said that the actions of private schools are directly subject to the
equal protection clause," it has held that the government may not provide aid
s Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The EqualRights Amendment; A ConstitutionalBasis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971).
9 This is the answer Emerson, supra note 4 offers to the argument advanced by ERA opponents in Connecticut.
" For an early and extensive analysis of this question see Gallagher, Desegregation;The Effect of the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment on Single-Sex Colleges, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 41
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Gallagher].
11 It has been argued that education is a quasi-public function independent of the particular
institution involved, and also that nearly all private institutions rely so heavily on government
funds as to be inseparable from government itself. Thus, one could claim that these institutions
should be directly subject to constitutional oversight. See O'Neil, Private Universities and Public
Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1969-70). See also, ARTHUR S. MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND
PRIVATE EDUCATION (1957). The public function theory is but one of the ways private conduct may
become subject to the commands of the fourteenth amendment. If the state's involvement in the
private activity is significant, the constitutional mandates apply, Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). There is, however, no exact definition of what constitutes "significant."
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the state in
private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton, at 720. The extension of the constitutional bar against racial discrimination to private universities and colleges is compatible with the
analyses presented by Brown, State Action Analysis of Tax Expenditures, 11 HARV. CIV.
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to private schools which discriminate against blacks.12 In Norwood v. Harrison,'3 Justice Burger specifically rejected the argument that equated
assistance to religious schools with aid to racially segregated schools. The
Constitution places a value on religion but not on discrimination. In Justice
Burger's words:
[t]he transcendent value of free religious exercise in our constitutional scheme
leaves room for 'play at the joints' to the extent of cautiously delineated
secular governmental assistance to religious schools, despite the fact that such
assistance touches on the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by indirectly benefiting the religious schools and their sponsors. In contrast,
although the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places no value on
discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the Free Exercise Clause.'"
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 97 (1976); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TRIBE]; Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414 (1973-74); Annot., 37
A.L.R. FED. 601. But see, Thigpen, The Application of FourteenthAmendment Norms to Private
Colleges and Universities, 11 J. LAW AND ED. 171 (1982). For more general analyses opposing any
additional diminution of the distinction between state and private action, see, e.g., Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the 14th Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958); St.
Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection,and
Private Racial Discrimination,59 MIcH. L. REV. 993 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REV. 347 (1963).
2 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion in Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), observed that Norwood remained good precedent. However,
he also suggested that government aid to racially segregated schools might have been permitted
in Norwood had the case not arisen "following judicial decrees desegregating public school
systems." 436 U.S. at 463. Whether Rehnquist or those who joined his opinion intended this suggestion as a limitation on the applicability of Norwood is unclear. The Court in Norwood
specifically stated that its holding did not rest on a finding of state intent to discriminate. In fact,
the Court noted that the aid program had been "motivated by ... a sincere interest in the educational welfare of all Mississippi children." 436 U.S. at 466.
,3 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
" Id. at 469-70. Racial discrimination is a particularly suspect activity. According to the principle announced in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1967), one test is the extent
of the government involvement. However, in assessing whether there is a sufficient relationship
between government action and a private institution to require that the institution submit to the
mandate of the fourteenth amendment, the degree of involvement is but one of the factors
measured in assessing whether the Constitution applies. Of equal or possibly even greater importance is the nature of the questioned activity. There is more support for applying the Constitution
against racial discrimination than against possible violations of the procedural guarantees of the
due process clause. See Note, The JudicialRole in Attacking Racial Discrimination in TaxExempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979). A similar point is made in Glennon and
Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis of the FourteenthAmendment "State Action"Requirement, 1976
Sue. CT. REV. 221. See also Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving
American Ideal, 6 HuM. RTS. 1 (1976-77). The view that the claim asserted affects the extent of
government involvement necessary to make the constitutional commands applicable to private activity is consistent with the position taken by many lower courts: Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81
(2d Cir. 1968); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1140-42 (2d Cir. 1973); Sament v.
Hahnemann Medical College and Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434, (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd. mem., 547 F.2d
1164 (3d Cir. 1976); Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d
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Lower courts have held, and the Supreme Court has affirmed without opinion, that government may not provide specialized tax exemptions to institutions which practice racial discrimination."5
If the state/private distinction does not hold, then it is necessary to come
to grips with the substantive issue of whether sex-segregated education has
a place in education, and if it does, whether a flat prohibition of gender
classifications makes sense. Even if the state/private distinction survives, it
could be rendered meaningless should tax exemptions be denied on other
grounds. Although the Court has refrained from a direct constitutional ruling
on tax exemptions, it recently held in Bob Jones University v. United
States" that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had correctly interpreted
the IRS Code in denying tax-exempt status to private schools which
discriminated on the basis of race. Critics of the decision were quick to warn
that schools which restricted their admissions on the basis of sex might well
be next." Under the current state of the law, the conclusion is unwarranted.
However, if gender classifications were to be constitutionally barred or if
women's schools were found to have no public benefit, then Bob Jones might
indeed apply to single-sex institutions. Since most private colleges and
universities receive financial support from the government and benefit greatly from tax-exempt status, the threat of withdrawal of these privileges along
with the likely ineligibility of students to receive government assistance
ifteans that these institutions must in practice comply with constitutional
restrictions.18
There are several reasons why a reconsideration of the status of single-

355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). For a more extensive list and analysis see Annot., 37 A.L.R. FED. 601 § 7.
"5E.g., Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970) appeal dismissed sub nom., Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) aff'd sub nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Jackson
v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Falkenstein v.
Dept. of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Or. 1972) (three judge court), stay denied sub nom., Oregon
Elks v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S. 1032 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973). Support for the
position that tax exemptions are the functional equivalent of government subsidies is widespread:
see, e.g., Reling, Federal Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?,44 A.B.A. J. 525 (1958);
Warrn, Property Tax Exemptions for Charitable,Educationa4 Religious and GovernmentalInstitutions in Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REV. 181 (1971). It is a view at least implicitly endorsed by
the Supreme Court: Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397
U.S. 664 (1970); Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Consequently, the logical conclusion is that tax exemptions may not be provided private schools
which employ racially discriminatory policies. See Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial
Discriminationin Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. REv. 379 (1979); Comment, Racial
Segregation and Tax-Exempt Status of Private,Religious Institutions, 25 How. L.J. 545 (1982).
" 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
,7 G. Will, Bob Jones U.: Why Didn't Congress Act? Washington Post, May 29, 1983, at C7.
, Gallagher, supra note 10, at 74, discusses the effects of a loss of government aid.
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sex women's colleges is now timely. First, the equal rights amendment continues to have broad support, and although narrowly defeated in the House in
November 1983, it will surely be reintroduced. Its proper interpretation remains a significant issue. Experience with racial classifications suggests that
on the way to equality, it may be sometimes necessary to take account of
race. The same may be true of gender. A candid recognition of this concept is
preferable to the tendency either to defer interpretation to the courts or to
search for ways around the implications of a blanket rule. Moreover, unaddressed issues may only bolster the opposition to ERA, as exemplified in a
recent congressional hearing. 9 In addition, even without ERA, issues of
gender classification are raised in the interpretation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The vacillation of the Supreme Court in
1981 concerning the permissibility of gender classifications 0 was followed in
1982 by a reaffirmation of heightened scrutiny.21 Moreover, that reaffirmation occurred in the context of a challenge to sex-segregated education. In
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,' the Supreme Court ordered an
end to admissions policies at the Mississippi University for Women's School
of Nursing that denied men entrance, thus reopening the question of the constitutionally of sex-segregated public education regardless of whether an
equal rights amendment is adopted. Thus, as a result of Bob Jones, even if
the renewed effort at ERA ratification is unsuccessful, the restrictive admissions policies of private universities could face difficulties if Hogan is followed by a determination that sex segregation has no place in public education.
These developments in themselves would warrant a reexamination of the
legal status of single-sex schools. They are significant, however, not only for
the future of such schools and for the broader question of which tests are to
be applied to gender classifications under the Constitution, but also for a still
larger issue of constitutional study: the place of fixed rules in constitutional
analysis. This Article will undertake a reexamination of the status of private
single-sex education for women in light of the develoments of the past two
years, and in so doing it will address also these larger issues. Part I focuses
on the recent Bob Jones decision, in which the Court decided on statutory
grounds that the IRS had power to deny exemption because discriminating
against blacks clearly violates fundamental public policy. In part II, I shall
argue that Bob Jones neither requires nor allows the IRS to deny tax exemptions to single-sex colleges. This section describes the present position of
Congress and the Court with respect to single-sex education. Beginning with
the congressional treatment of the issue it assesses the implications of Title

, G. Will, Praisethe ERA and Pass the Buck, Washington Post, June 2, 1983 at A21.
See Dubnoff, Sex Discriminationand the Burger Court: A Retreat in Progress?1981 FORDHAMi
L. REV. 369 [hereinafter cited as Dubnoffl.
I Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
SId.
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IX of the Education Amendments of 1972? and the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974.24 The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning
single-sex education is Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.2 5 The implications of this case for sex-segregated education are examined, and how
the decision fits into the Court's past treatment of gender classifications is
discussed. I argue that Hogan seems to be a narrow decision confined to
situations where a school harms women by perpetuating stereotypes. Under
the standard adopted by the Court, some single-sex programs can be defended even in state schools. At the same time, the decision contains some reasoning that, if accepted by a majority of the Court, threatens the long-term
viability of even private schools. Part III examines the argument for allowing
voluntary single-sex education for women. I argue that while it is not conclusive that single-sex education actually benefits women, the evidence at
least highly suggests that it does, and there certainly is no convincing data
that women have been harmed. Further studies are needed, but in the meantime, single-sex education should not be precluded as an option. This analysis
suggests the dangers of reading ERA to prohibit all gender clasifications-the view that earlier commentafors accepted uncritically. 8 Part IV
provides a more general argument against a doctrinaire reading of ERA.
Finally, the conclusion discusses the place of fixed rules in constitutional intrepretation and attempts to distinguish those situations in which the Court
should establish a single standard for all cases from situations in which a
more flexible position is appropriate.

I. BOB JONES AND TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
In Bob Jones University v. United States,' the Supreme Court upheld
the IRS's determination that institutions which practice racial discrimination
are not entitled to tax-exempt status. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that to qualify for tax-exempt status an institution
must be "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitble ... or
educational purposes. . . ." The IRS determined that this section implicitly
includes the additional requirements that such institutions be "charitable" as
understood in common law. To be "charitable" an institution must provide a
public benefit and must not act contrary to public policy. 9 Educational institutions which practice racial discrimination cannot, under this standard,
qualify for such status. What are the implications of this ruling? How much

- 20 U.S.C. § 1681.

24 20 U.S.C. § 1701.
2

102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).

2 Gallagher, supra note 10.
2

103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
Rev. Rul. 71-747, 1971-72 Cum. Bull. 230.
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discretion does ihe IRS now have to allow or disallow tax-exempt status based
on its independent determination of public benefit and public policy? Can the
IRS now determine, for example, that single-sex schools do not provide a
public benefit or that they violate fundamental public policy and hence no
longer qualify for tax-exempt status?
The essential facts of the case are only marginaly at issue. In 1970, the
IRS announced that tax-exempt status would no longer be granted to private
schools which had racially restrictive admissions policies. In addition, gifts
donated to such schools would no longer be treated as "charitable deductions
for income tax purposes [under Section 170]." 30The IRS acted under pressure
from the courts. In January, 1970, a three-judge District Court for the
District of Columbia had issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the granting of tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi which maintained
racially restrictive admissions policies." Subsequently, this initial determination was sustained in a ruling on the merits.2 Making the injunction permanent, the district court intrepreted the tax code as forbidding the granting of
tax-exempt status to schools that practiced discrimination.3 The IRS gave
the ruling general applicability.
Two of the schools affected by this policy were Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro Christian Schools. Both of these schools, based on their interpretation of the Bible, employ racially restrictive polices. Bob Jones University is
an institution of higher education. Until 1975, unmarried blacks were not admitted. As a result of a Fourth Circuit decision in McCrary v. Runyon34 the
school then allowed unmarried blacks to enter, but enforced a prohibition on
interracial dating and marriage. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. provides
elementary and secondary education. Admissions have been restricted largely to whites although some children of mixed marriages in which one of the
parents is white have been allowed to enroll. Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro Christian Schools were both denied tax-exempt status as a result
of the IRS's policy. Goldsboro had never been granted such status and Bob
Jones University had its status revoked. Each school, making similar
arguments, challenged the IRS's action. 5 Two basic claims were made: (1) the
IRS exceeded its authority in revoking the tax-exempt status to institutions
103 S. Ct. at 2021 (quoting IRS News Release (7/10170)).
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom., Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
32 Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp'. 1150, affd sub nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).

"'
3

Id.

515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), affd 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Bob Jones made the additional argument that even if the IRS had the right to deny tax exempt status to schools which practiced racial discrimination, the application to Bob Jones was inappropriate because since 1975 it had not practiced a racially restrictive admissions policy. The
Court rejected the argument, pointing out that its policies with respect to dating and marriage
were restrictive.
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which qualified under one of the statute's designated categories and; (2) in
any event, the revocation violated the school's rights under the free exercise
clause of the first amendment. The first argument was the only one which
gained any serious judicial support. In the Bob Jones case, the district court
struck down the IRS's action, agreeing with the argument that it had gone
beyond its authority. 8 This decision was reversed by the court of appeals,
which interpreted the tax code as implying that tax-exempt status could be
provided only
to institutions that met the listed criteria, and were in addition
"charitable".37 Relying on the common law definition that to be "charitable"
an institution must not act contrary to public policy, the court's affirmation of
the IRS decision was logical, since racial discrimination in education is clearly
contrary to such policy. Goldsboro's claims were rejected in both the district
and appellate courts. The suits were combined before the Supreme Court.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions issued by the appellate court. The suggestion that the IRS
action violated the first amendment was unanimously rejected. Attention
focused on the IRS's authority. Although no one doubted that Congress had
the power to deny tax-exempt status to institutions which violated public
policy, at issue was whether the IRS could do so without explicit statutory
authorization and, more critically, contrary to what appeared to be the plain
language of the statute. In setting the criteria for the granting of tax-exempt
status, the statute states that "corporations ...organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable ...or educational purposes"3 qualify for
tax exemptions. The institutions asserted that this language is incompatible
with the IRS's interpretation, and that not only was there no express requirement that an organization be charitable but the use of "or" to separate
the enumerated activities means that an institution need meet only one of the
required characteristics.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority conceded that a literal
reading of the passage cited Would seem to support the University's claim. In
rejecting such a literal reading, he relied primarily on four considerations.
First, such clause-bound analysis is incomplete. Read more broadly the Internal Revenue Code allows a different interpretation. Specifically turning to
Section 170(a),19 Burger observed that the term "charitable" appears in this
section and that here a list of characteristics identical to that employed in
Section 501(c)(3)" is used to define this term. Burger pointed out that it is
unlikely that the list meant different things in the two passages. Charitable

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States (D.S.C. 1978).

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
26 U.S.C. § 170 (1976).
,oId. at § 501(c)(3) (1976).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss2/5

8

Dubnoff: Does Gender Equality Always Imply Gender Blindness--The Status of

SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION

1984]

is the focus; the list is explanatory of what is meant by charitable. This indicates that "in enacting both [Sections 170 and 501(c)(3)] Congress sought to
provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement
or take the place of public institutions of the same kind."" Second, he traced
the historical purpose of enacting tax exemptions and concluded that they
were designed to promote the activities of agencies that provided a public
benefit. It follows that Congress did not intend to benefit organizations that
acted contrary to public policy: "A corollary to the public benefit principle is
the requirement, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the purpose of a
charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy."' 2
Next, he examined past operations of the IRS and found it has traditionally
exercised broad authority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code, sometimes
denying tax-exempt status beyond the specified categories. 3 Finally, Justice
Burger noted Congress's failure to vote out of committee any of the bills introduced to overturn the IRS's action and Congress's addition of a provision
to the Internal Revenue Code denying tax-exempt status to social clubs that
maintained racially or religious discriminatory policies, and determined that
Congress was aware of and concurred with the IRS's action.44
It is well accepted that Congress is free to delegate authority to administrative agencies to enforce policy, provided that it has determined the
basic policy and has formulated the standards by which agency decisions can
proceed. Legislation that delegates broad authority has been consistently
upheld because it is recognized that flexibility is needed if the agencies are to
carry out the tasks assigned. 5 There is also considerable support for the proposition that Congress can retroactively endorse executive action,46 and that
the approval need not be explicit,47 Justice Rehnquist's assertion to the con" 103 S. Ct. at 2026 (1983). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist disputes this reading of the Code. To
him the list merely confirms that Congress had established the qualifying criteria. Id. at 2040.
4

Id. at 2028.

" The Court referred to the denial of a charitable exemption to an organization that engaged
in a proscribed political activity prior to the inclusion by Congress of this factor as a basis for dis-

qualification. Id. at 2031.
' Id. at 2032.
See, e.g., New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932) (allowing
consolidation of carriers when in the public interest); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (sustaining "just and reasonable" rates for natural gas); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upheld as reasonable licensing standard "public
interest, convenience, or necessity").
42

Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863) (upholding seizure of ships pursuant to presidential order

subsequently aproved by Congress); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (sustaining FCC fairness doctrine approved subsequently by Congress).
" "[Tlhe construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed
unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to
alter the administrative construction." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 381 (footnote omitted).
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trary notwithstanding. 8 The problem is that the statute is silent on the
authority delegated, and on the standards to be applied in its enforcement.
Moreover, the guidance which flows from the subsequent congressional action is unclear. This action might be considered either as granting broad
discretionary authority to the IRS, or as limiting the denial of tax exemptions
specifically to cases of racial discrimination, or as something in-between. It
does seem clear that unless some limiting guidelines are established, the IRS
could play a considerable role in shaping political and social policy. Such a
role for the IRS is surely undesireable.
The common law concept of charity is very broad. If the Court intended
that the IRS were henceforth to assess in every instance whether an institution's activities benefited the public and did not violate public policy, the
power granted would be extensive. This is clearly not what the majority purported to do. The Court cautioned the IRS that a declaration of noncharitability "should be made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy," and that such
questions must be approached "with full awareness that determination of
public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with serious implications for the institutions affected."' 9 The Court extracted from the spirit of
the law the proposition that Congress could not possibly have meant to encourage through tax exemptions -which are designed to foster favored activities-policies it clearly opposed. From this the Court concluded that the
IRS had the discretion to deny tax-exempt status to institutions whose
policies were without doubt contrary to established policy."' If an institution
falls into the categories established by Congress, and there is a question as to
the value of its activities, then the question should be decided in favor of the
institution. It is only when it is inconceivable that Congress would wish to
support the activity, and where the policy violated is "fundamental," that tax
exempt status could be denied.5' This is not a license to the IRS to conduct
unbounded policy reviews.
Justice Powell took exception to what he viewed as the majority's expansive language, which he feared created a public benefit standard for taxexempt status. He would have upheld the IRS's determination that tax exemptions should not be granted to institutions which practice racial
discrimination, on the basis that subsequent congressional action, in effect,
" "[T]his type of congressional inaction is of virtually no weight in determining legislative in-

tent." 103 S. Ct. at 2043. Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the initial statutory intent is probably correct but his failure to take into proper account Congress's later action is at least questionable.
"Id. at 2029, 2032.

Perhaps the Court is allowing the IRS to apply a "shock the conscience" test. This term
was used by Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) to describe why the

police conduct challenged in that case violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
" 103 S.Ct. at 2029.
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ratified it.2 The amendment to the IRS Code which extended the denial of tax
exemptions to social clubs was controlling. As noted earlier, finding executive action legal as a result of subsequent congressional action has considerable precedent." Had Justice Powell's view been adopted, it would have
been far more limiting. Nonetheless, the Court has not left the IRS with
unlimited authority.
Had the Court not found the IRS action justifiable, it would have had to
reach the issue, raised in the amicus briefs, 5 of whether the tax exemptions
are permissible under the equal protection clause, an issue with implications
broader than the one at hand. The- desirability of avoiding constitutional
issues where possible is apparent here. A claim based on the equal protection
clause requires state action as a prerequisite. The consequences of a decision that implies that a university which receives some government aid must
abide by the norms of the fourteenth amendment are far-reaching. Such a
decision might, for example, mean that universities would have to follow the
commands of the due process clause. It might also lead to the conclusion that
they would be subjected to the commands of a variety of statutes which at
the moment apply only to the state.57 Yet, the effect of a converse decision
that the government could aid schools which deny admission to blacks would
be no less serious. Avoidance of the state action issue thus has much to comment it.
In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones is not a broad decision
which establishes an analytic framework for delineating the scope of IRS
discretion to establish and revoke tax exemptions. Rather, it is not much
more than a narrow affirmation of the specific action taken here. It reflects
both the deep conviction of the overwhelming majority of justices that racial
discrimination in schools is so totally unacceptable that no governmental aid
can be countenanced, and the inclination of most justices toward restraint
where possible. By finding that the IRS had the power to deny tax-exempt
status to schools that discriminated, the Court avoided the constitutional issue
of whether the equal protection clause required it to do so.
II.

IMPLICATIONS OF BOB JONES FOR PRIVATE WOMEN'S COLLEGES

Where does this decision leave private women's colleges and universities? In the preceding section, I have noted that under Bob Jones, the
Id. at 2037 (Powell, J., concurring).
- 26 U.S.C. § 501(i) (Supp. II 1979).
u See supra note 46.
Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and The American Jewish Committee, Amici
Curia in Support of Affirmance at 17-33 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983);
Brief of Amicus Curia in Support of the Judgment Below at 57-62, Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
TRIBE, supra note 11, at §§ 18-20.
, This is not to say that such a broad finding is required.
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revocation of tax-exempt status is to be allowed "only where there can be no
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy."'8
Measured against this standard, private women's colleges and universities
should have little difficulty retaining their tax-exempt status.
The Court, in affirming the IRS's determination that Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools were correctly denied tax-exempt status,
observed, "there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrmination in
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice."'9
with references to congressional actions and to an
It supported this assertion
"unbroken line of cases" ' dating from Brown v. Board of Education." The
position with respect to racial discrimination in education is, in short, clear.
The same cannot be said with respect to single-sex education. Neither Congress nor the Court has taken a consistent position on this question.
A.

Congress and the Equal Educational OpportunitiesAct

A review of Congressional action indicates no support for the suggestion
that private single-sex education violates any public policy, to say nothing of
"fundamental" public policy. Legislative intent in this area is in fact difficult
to determine. The situation is particularly complicated where, as here, there
is more than one relevant statute, each with its own legislative history. It is
possible to offer intelligent, plausible, and yet conflicting interpretations
when one attempts to ascertain Congress's attitude toward single-sex education. For purposes of the analysis here, we need only show the absence of
definitive opposition.
To the extent that Congress has spoken directly on the subject, it has
consciously allowed single-sex institutions to continue. In 1972, Congress
sought to assure educational equality for females by extending the prohibition against federal funding for schools which discriminate on the basis of
race to include schools which discriminate on the basis of sex. 2 Addressed to
the admissions policies of postsecondary schools, Title IX, however,
specifically included a waiver for traditionally single-sex schools. The relevant section of the waiver reads: "[11n regard to admissions this section shall
not apply to any public institutions of undergraduate higher education which
is an institution that traditionally and continually from its establishment has
had a policy of admitting only students of one sex."'' Those sections of the
Bill directed at elementary and secondary schools initially contained a provi1 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
5' Id.
eo Id.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
20 U.S.C. § 1685(a)(1) (1976).
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sion which would have banned single-sex schools. It was eliminated in the
Senate. According to Senator Birch Bayh, the sponsor of the relevant change,
little was known about the extent and effects of single-sex education. He
argued that absent such knowledge, action to ban such schools should be
postponed."
Had this been Congress's only word on the subject its position would be
clear. Two years later however, it passed the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974.65 This Act contains language which at first blush would
seem to indicate that Congress had reversed its judgment. Two sections are
particularly pertinent. Section 1702(a)(1) reads: "The Congress finds that-(1)
the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to
schools solely on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin denied to
those students the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment."66 Section 1703(c) reads:
No state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account
of his or her race, color, sex or national origin by ...(c) the assignment by an

educational agency of a student to a school, other than the one closest to his or
her place of residence within the school district in which he or she resides, if
the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of students on the
basis of race, color, sex or national origin among the schools of such an agency
than would result if such a student were assigned to the school closest to his
or her place of residence within the school district of such agency providing
the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student.'
Whether this Act intended to prohibit single-sex education is not clear." As
the most recent statute, it would control the issue at least with respect to
public schools.
There are several reasons why the statute does not establish Congress's
position on single-sex education. To begin with, the most critical fact for the
analysis here is that however one interprets the EEOA, it applies neither to
private nor to postsecondary schools.69 The dispute concerns what EEOA
means for primary and secondary public education. It is not necessarily true
that sentiments expressed on these matters will carry over to views on
private education where educational diversity might be valued. Beyond that,
the language quoted above is not dispositive. First, it is not the only relevant
118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (February 28, 1972).
0 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (1976).
' 20 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (1976).
See Yen, Single Sex Schools and Sex Segregation Within Schools: Constitutional and
Statutory Remedies, 55 CONN. B.J. 387, 390-91 (1981). But see, Case Developments-Sex
Segregated Public Schools: Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia and the Judicial
Definition of an Equal Educationfor Women, 4 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 79, 89-96 (1978).
e320 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) provides: "All children enrolled in public schools ......
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language. Other sections of the Act specifically omit sex when discussing the
segregation that is prohibited."0 These omissions, taken alone, might lead one
to conclude that the statute was sloppily written and/or ambiguous. There
are, however, other reasons to consider Congressional treatment of singlesex education with caution. This Act was initially introduced in the same
year as Title IX. Perhaps Congress had amassed in the two years between its
introduction and passage significant data on which to reverse its earlier
postponement. If so, there is no evidence to that effect. Furthermore, if Congress intended to reverse the position it had taken just two years earlier,
nowhere does it expressly say so. Absent evidence to the contrary, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that Congress's focus was what it had always
been-on racial issues.
Two courts called upon to apply the law came up with conflicting positions. In United States v. Hinds County School Board," the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the EEOA bans sex-segregated public schools.
Prior to the adoption of the Act, the Amite School District, pursuant to a
court order requiring racial integration, had replaced racial segregation with
sex-segregation. 7 The plan was approved in the district court but before the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had issued a decision the EEOA was passed.
At that point, the United States, the original plaintiff in the suit, challenged
the sex-segregation. The circuit court then held that the Act placed a ban on
sex-segregated public schools and remanded the case to the district court."
The Third Circuit reached a different conclusion in Vorchheimer v.
74
School District.
The facts were, of course, distinguishable. The case involved a challenge by Susan Vorchheimer to her exclusion from Philadelphia's all
male Central High School, one of the city's two academic high schools. Both of
the academic high schools are sex-segregated: Central is restricted to males;
Girls High School, as the name suggests, to females. Susan Vorchheimer was
informed that although she was scholastically qualified to attend Central, she
was ineligible because of her sex. Vorchheimer preferred Central to Girls
70 20

U.S.C. § 1703 (1976) provides:

No state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his
or her race, color, sex or national origin, by (a) the deliberate segregation by an educa-

tional agency of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among or within
schools; (b) the transfer by an educational agency ... of a student from one school to
another if the purpose and effect of such transfer is to increase segregation of the
students on the basis of race, color or national origin ......
560 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977).
7'In view of the South's traditional concern that racial integration would lead to interracial
marriages, one suspects that the southern plan was based less on carefully considered valid educational purposes than on a desire to limit the social effects of desegregation.
"' United States v. Hinds County School Board, 560 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977).
7, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) affd by equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
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because of its academic reputation, her favorable reaction to its atmosphere,
and its superior scientific facilities. When she was refused admission to Central, she enrolled in a non-academic high school close to her home and filed a
class action in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex
in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 (EEOA)5 and
the fourteenth amendment. The district court ruled in favor of Vorchheimer,
holding that the school policy was constitutionally infirm because the school
board had failed to demonstrate that the gender classification bore a "fair
and substantial relationship" to its legitimate interest. 7' The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted the district court's factual finding while rejecting
its constitutional holding. In addition, it held that the EEOA did not prohibit
the existence of single-sex schools." The court viewed Congress's position

with respect to single-sex education as ambiguous. What was important for
the court was the attitude of Congress as expressed in Title IX and in the
debates surrounding the EEOA beginning in 1972 when it was first introduced. As already noted, Title IX explicitly permits single-sex education in
schools in which it has been traditional. The Third Circuit also found,
however, that the textual disparities between Section 1702(a)(1) and Section
1703(a) 8 cloud the meaning of the EEOA. What is forbidden by the EEOA is
the mandatory assignment of students on the basis of sex, and this did not apply to Vorchheimer since attendance at the academic schools is a matter of
choice. 9 Thus, the lower courts are divided on the statutory interpretation of
EEOA regarding single-sex education.
To the extent that the executive branch has had anything to say on this
subject, it seems to have adopted the position that educational equality but
not necessarily educational integration is what is assured. Regulations promulgated by HEW," extending Title IX's coverage to primary and secondary
schools even though such schools are not covered by Title IX, specify that
federal funding will be denied to "local educational agencies" which maintain
single-sex schools or programs unless equal facilities are provided the other
8
sex. 1
In short, Congress has mandated sexual equality in education but it has
not precluded "separate" facilities as a way of attaining this equality even in
the public setting.
75 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
78 See supra text accompanying note 65.
532 F.2d at 886.
' Now the Department of Education.
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-106.71 (1982).
71
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The Supreme Court-Recent Decisions

Should the Supreme Court rule as it has done with respect to race that
separation by sex in education is inherently unequal, the IRS would not only
be justified in denying tax exempt status to private schools with sex-restrictive admissions policies but it might well be forced to do so. Should Congress
overturn a statutory interpretation of the tax code under the circumstances
just described, it is likely that there would be a direct challenge on the constitutional issue that the Supreme Court avoided in Bob Jones. So far, the
Court has declined to make this analogy, although some of the dissenting
justices in Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan2 held that such is the
implication of that decision.
1.

Early Court Action: Vorchheimer

Until 1981, the Supreme Court had not directly ruled on the issue of
single-sex education, but had on occasion denied review of lower court decisions which have sanctioned the practice.' Since most such cases were decided prior to the Court's application of a stricter standard to gender classifications, they provide little guidance for the issue today. The one exception is
Vorchheimer v. School District,' referred to in the last section. This decision,
handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1976, was affirmed by
an equally divided Supreme Court in 1977, with Justice Rehnquist not participating, and thus carries no precedential value. Nevertheless, it has shaped
the debate on how the issue should be treated and merits attention.
Under current Supreme Court practice, whether or not a classification is
seen as constitutionally permissible turns on several related issues, the most
important of which is the standard of review applied. In equal protection
analysis, the choice of the standard often determines the outcome, since the
standard of review determines not only the extent to which the Court will
make an independent judgment as to the validity of a law, but also the scope
of the review and the amount of evidence required to prove the validity of a
classification. The basic standards of review developed by the Supreme Court
to assess claims under the equal protection clause are by now familiar. 5
Government actions which distinguish among groups in the population may
be subjected to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or a rational basis test.
When strict scrutiny is applied to a classification, the government must
102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
' See Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1958),

reh'g denied 359 U.S. 999 (1959); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1961); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (three-judge court),
affd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
' TRMaE, supra note 11, at § 16-30.
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demonstrate that its interest is compelling and that the classification is
necessary to promote the interest. The Court assesses the legitimacy of the
government's ends as well as the congruence between the classification and
the legislative purpose. This standard is so difficult, the test has been
described as "'strict' in theory but fatal in fact."88 When, on the other hand,
the Court uses a rational relationship test, almost nothing is required by way
of proof. Although in theory the rational relationship test involves a meanends inquiry, that is, the classification must bear some relationship to a
legitimate government objective, in practice, once the Court accepts this
test, it makes little effort to challenge the rationality of the government action or to review the aims of the action. The Court has even offered justifications in the absence of an adequate government case.87 In addition to strict
scrutiny and the rationality standard, the Court has used an intermediate
standard of review which lies between these two in stringency. In general
under an intermediate standard the government must demonstrate an important interest and the relationship of the classification to the interest must be
substantial.8
I do not mean to suggest in this brief description that there is complete
agreement on what is required under each of the standards. For example,
under the intermediate standard there are some differences over how important the interest must be or how accurate the fit need be between the interest and the classification. 9 Even the strict scrutiny standard may not be
as precise as was long assumed. There has always been some controversy
over whether strict scrutiny allows review of government objectives, or only
an examination of the congruence of the classification to the end. Its usage in
the context of fundamental rights is not as rigorous as when a suspect
classification is involved. Moreover, there is language in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke"' to suggest that even when suspect
classifications are involved, less than complete congruence between the
classification and the interest might be acceptable." These differences in interpretation of what is required under each standard do not negate the importance of the standard to the outcome. Sex-segregated education can easily

" Gunther, Forward.In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955).
The Supreme Court most commonly employs intermediate scrutiny in sex discrimination
cases. For a statement of the standard, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
TRIBE, supra note 56, at § 16-30.
" 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
'1 Karst and Horowitz have argued that although Powell invokes strict scrutiny, he does not
require the university to make the sort of demonstration of benefits to be derived from student
diversity that would be required under a traditional application of strict scrutiny. Karst &
Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal ProtectionDoctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 13
(1979); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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be sustained if the rational basis test is employed. The state need only show
that some respectable educational opinion considers such schools to be
preferable. If intermediate scrutiny is employed the level of needed evidence
increases.
The differences in the decisions of the district and appellate courts in
Vorchheimer were very much affected by the choice of scrutiny. The appellate court accepted two key aspects of the district court's factual findings,
and then went on to employ a rational basis test. The district court had concluded that the high schools offered comparable educational benefits and that
there was educational evidence that supported the value of single-sex education. Given the long history of single-sex education, its wide acceptance, and
the equality of the facilities, the court of appeals was reluctant to overturn
the decisions of educators who had primary responsibility for running the
school system. In addition, the court viewed the segregation as voluntary.
That being the case, it did not require a rigorous demonstration that singlesex education was beneficial to one or to both sexes. Instead, it was sufficient
that some educators believed that single-sex education was valuable.
The "separate but equal""' doctrine seemingly was given new life in the
context of sex-segregated education. In my view, the court of appeals made
two central errors. First, the schools were not equal even by the court's own
description. As the court noted, Central High School's scientific facilities
were superior to those at Girls High. 3 Second, the segregation was not truly
voluntary. Since there were no coeducational academic high schools, the only
additional choice that Susan Vorchheimer had was not to attend an academic
high school at all, with obvious costs. Judge Gibbons noted in his dissent that
"[h]er choice, like Plessy's is to submit to that segregation or refrain from
availing herself of the service."94 Furthermore, the majority's reasoning had
sexist overtones. Only by stereotyping girls could it find the differences in
science facilities unimportant. Beyond that, the majority used a traditional
sexist justification for discrimination against women in its effort to indicate
why classification by race, but not sex, was suspect. The majority claimed
that race was a suspect classification because it was irrational: "There is no
fundamental difference between races and therefore, in justice, there can be
no dissimilar treatment."95 In contrast, the court held that there are dif"Separate but equal" is the well known doctrine that was first stated in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895), in which the Court did not see action which separated the races as
discriminatory as long as each race received equal benefits. Not only did the separation in fact
connote inferiority of the minority, but equality of facilities never really was required. Conse-

quently, the phrase "separate but equal" has become synonymous with discrimination.
532 F.2d at 882.
Id. at 889 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
9 532 F.2d at 886.
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ferences between men and women which would make separate treatment rational and therefore allowable."
Vorchheimer has served as a perfect foil for those who oppose sex-segregated education. It is filled with sexist assumptions and statements. Judge
Gibbons' paraphrase of Plessy v. Ferguson makes the very idea of single-sex
education look discriminatory. Commentators following Gibbons' lead have
also consistently invoked the Plessy analogy, 8 noting that the Supreme
Court in overturning Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education99 held that racially segregated education is inherently unequal. I shall argue later that it
does not follow that one must conclude that sex-segregated education is also
inherently infirm under the Constitution. Only by examining who, if anyone,
is actually burdened and whether legitimate educational objectives are furthered can the issue be resolved. The point to be emphasized here is that the
Supreme Court did not reject the lower court's finding that the sex-segregated education practiced in Philadelphia was constitutional. Nor when it finally chose to speak directly on the subject did it embrace the position of the
bulk of commentary that followed Vorchheimer.
2. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan ' does not overrule the
broad principle of Vorchheimer that it is not constitutionally objectionable
for a state to provide sex-segregated education. It is not even clear that it requires a heavier burden of justification than the court of appeals insisted
upon in situations where no disparate treatment between the sexes was established. There is strong reason to believe, however, that the Supreme
Court would not so readily accept the characterization of the Philadelphia
system as equal and would therefore find that specific arrangement to be
impermissible."' Hogan may also establish intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for all gender discrimination.
In 1979, Joe Hogan, a registered nurse who desired to obtain a baccalaureate degree, sought admission to the Mississippi University for Women
Id.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See Comment, supra note 6; Note, Single-Sex Public Schools: The Last Bastion of
Separate but Equal, 1977 DUKE L.J. 259; Sex-Segregated PublicSchools: Vorchheimer v. Schools
District of Philadelphia and the JudicialDefinition of an Equal Educationfor Women, 4 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 79 (1978).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
,C 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).

A Pennsylvania court has in fact just ordered the admission of girls to Central High
School. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983 at A8. The case may never reach the Supreme Court. The city
has yet to decide whether to appeal. Beyond that, it may be found to rest on adequate state
ground. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1983 at A14.
101
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School of Nursing's baccalaureate program. He was refused solely because
that institution was restricted to female students, although he was told that
he could audit classes at the school. Asserting that the state had denied him
the equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment,
Hogan filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi asking for injunctive and declaratory relief and also
compensatory damages. The district court sided with the state; the court of
appeals reversed,"2 and the Supreme Court affirmed, 5-4. The holding itself
was a very narrow one; the women-only admissions policy of Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing was held to violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Not only did the Court avoid the question of single-sex education in general, but it left the University's other programs in place. In her opening and closing statements and in a footnote, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, emphasized the limited nature of the
decision. "This case presents the narrow issue of whether a state statute that
excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing
school violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend1
ment. ''loa The holding applies "only to Hogan's individual claim for relief.""
This case is distinguishable from the earlier cases. That Hogan suffered
an injury is clear-if the women-only policy of MUW were approved, he
would be forced either to give up his job or give up his goal of obtaining the
baccalaurate degree. Unlike Susan Vorchheimer, Hogan could not obtain his
education at even an arguably equivalent school within or near the city in
which he worked. The Court left open the question of how it would rule if
there were "separate but equal" schools. Hogan does not therefore even overrule the policy established in Vorchheimer.'°1 There is another feature of this
case, far weightier, that makes it difficult to extend it to other single-sex educational situations. The state contended that the single-sex environment
maintained at Mississippi University for Women benefited women and was
designed to compensate them for past discrimination. This was a position it
found hard to defend. The statement of purpose set forth in the enabling legislation establishing the school suggests not only that compensation was not
among the state's goals when it began the program, but that its purpose was
highly discriminatory toward women. 5 It did not provide, for the most part,
opportunities for education equal to that of men but rather offered women
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 646 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1981).
102 102 S. Ct. at 3334.
10

Id. at 3335 n.7.

The circumstances are also distinguishable from those in Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp.
134 (D.S.C. 1979), affd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971). (South Carolina not in violation of equal protection by
establishment of single-sex schools). In contrast to South Carolina, Mississippi did not provide
Hogan with the opportunity to attend an all male institution, and the system as a whole allocated
fewer places in nursing school to males.
115102 S. Ct. at 3339 n.16.
10
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education in areas traditionally considered to be appropriate to their gender.
The state's case was reduced to the argument that many educational experts
support single-sex schools as beneficial to women. However, the fact that
some single-sex schools might compensate women for past discrimination
does not mean that all do, and MUW's case was particularly weak. Women
have not been denied opportunities in nursing, a traditionally female occupation. Not only is the case for compensatory relief nonexistent, but the
evidence suggested that MUW's policy harmed women by reinforcing traditional job segregation. As the Court pointed out, "MUW's policy of excluding
males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."' 8 Furthermore,
evidence also suggested that excluding males from job categories depresses
wages. 1 7 In short, the Court might well have invalidated the sex-restrictive
policy as unjustifiably burdensome for women. No case was made that the
state had an interest in such a burden.
There are two aspects of the decision that suggest that its implications
might be broader than the Court admitted: (1) the standard of review invoked
in the context of a classification that the Court characterized as burdensome
to males; and (2) some of the reasoning employed by the Court in its discussion of single-sex education.
In Hogan, the Court invoked intermediate scrutiny in its most stringent
form. According to Justice O'Connor, discrimination on the basis of gender,
whether directed against males or females, is impermissible unless the state
can prove that it "at least ... serves 'important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."" 8 As the earlier discussion indicates, the
state did not come close to meeting the requisite burden of proof. In fact, the
record discloses a situation so clearly burdensome toward women that the
Court could easily have avoided passing on the question of appropriate standards when women are not injured. Does Hogan mean that all restrictive admissions policies require intermediate scrutiny? If it does, does it follow that
such policies will fail to meet the required standard?
In the context of sex discrimination, one has to be very careful in attributing authority to announced standards of the Court even when the standard seems to command a majority. Justice O'Connor stated that "[o]ur decisions ... establish that the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification.""' 9 Hogan was cer'
101

Id. at 3339.
Id. at 3339 n.5.

Id. at 3336 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
102 S. Ct. at 3336 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)); Fare v.Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707, 723 (1979).
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tainly not the first time the Court invoked these principles or claimed that
they represented the agreed upon state of the law.' There is historical
evidence, however, which undermines the Court's assertion.
It is generally accepted that the Court abandoned the deferential review
it had traditionally given to gender-based classifications in Reed v. Reed."'
Although a majority of the justices never agreed that sex was a suspect
classification, there appeared to be a clear movement in that direction. From
1971 until 1981, the Court did not uphold in a full opinion any statute which
employed a gender classification if that statute worked to disadvantage
women. However, the Court did uphold a number of gender classifications
nonburdensome to women,"' even though introduction of intermediate
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren,"' a case in which males were disadvantaged, left
the impression that henceforth all gender classifications would be disfavored.
There were of course, instances in which classifications injurious to males
were invalidated and intermediate scrutiny applied." 4 The observation that
the Court has implicitly invoked a stricter standard of review when women
are burdened compared to when they are not has been discussed in detail in a
prior article."' As also noted there, two decisions in 1981, Michael M. v.
Superior Court"' and Rostker v. Goldberg"' upheld gender classifications
harmful to women on analyses that did not even approximate the type of
scrutiny that Justice O'Connor claims is the norm.
Justice O'Connor's arrival on the Court may provide more solid and consistent support for the use of intermediate scrutiny, but it would be
"' See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981);
Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
"1 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (upheld a statute which denied unwed fathers
the right of recovery for the wrongful death of a child while granting unwed mothers the same
right); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (permitted distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers affecting inheritance rights of illegitimate children); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)
(upheld statute which permitted an unwed mother to authorize the adoption of an illegitimate
child without the father's consent unless he had legitimated the child); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1977) (preference accorded relationship between mothers and children in immigration law upheld).
"1 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
.. In addition to Craig v. Boren, gender classifications in which males were disfavored were
voided in Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). Only in
Cabanis it clear that males are the only ones disadvantaged and that the most exacting level of intermediate scrutiny was used. Even in that case, however, there is some ambiguity whether the
trigger for close review was the gender classification or the fundamental interest involved (the
right to a relationship with one's children). It is hard to be sure, because, as already noted, the
Court did not apply the same exacting standard or consider gender classifications objectionable in
other situations in which men were harmed. The classification in Orr involved a hidden cost for
women: the reinforcement of roles within the family.
". Dubnoff, supra note 20.
"' 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
117 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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premature to predict that it assures a majority. The simple fact is that only
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White have consistently adhered to this
standard."' The addition of Justice O'Connor would still fall short of a stable
majority. Justice Stevens, who represented the fifth vote in Hogan, agrees
with the proposition that the scrutiny applied to gender classifications should
be the same whether men or women are disadvantaged. However, in the past
he has expressed the view that gender classifications are allowable as long as
they are the result of a conscious legislative choice and reflect real differences between males and females.' This is a step below the requirement
of an "exceedingly persuasive" justification. 2 ° Beyond that, it is unclear
whether any gender classification would trigger intermediate scrutiny or
only a classification that harms a particular group.
Even if the heightened scrutiny invoked in Hogan survives, it does not
follow, Justice Powell notwithstanding, that public education must be
coeducational. If legitimate and sufficiently important educational objectives
are furthered, sex-segregated education might well meet the burden of proof
required under intermediate scrutiny. According to the majority, even a
discriminatory gender classification is permissible if its purpose and effect is
to redress past burdens: "In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists
members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened.""' It may therefore
be possible to justify the continued existence of at least some private
women's colleges. Whether or not similar public schools exist remains to be
seen, but even if they do not, it is undisputed that historically women have
not been offered educational opportunities equal to that of men. As the Court
itself points out, "women's colleges were founded to provide some form of

1' Since Craig, Justices Burger and Rehnquist voted to sustain gender classifications: Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Canan v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Justice Blackmun joined them in Fiallo, Rostker, and
Michael M. Justice Blackmun's concurrance in Orr specifically mentioned that he considered Kahn
to be good law. Kahn was not an instance of exacting scrutiny. Justice Stevens voted to uphold
gender classifications in Rostker, Caban and Parham. Justice Powell's votes to sustain sex
classifications occured in Rostker, Michael M. and Parham.
"I Justice Stevens, dissenting in Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) wrote,
If we assume, as we surely must, that characteristics possessed by all members of one
class and by no members of the other class justify some disparate treatment of mothers
and fathers of children born out of wedlock, the mere fact that the statute draws a
"gender-based distinction"... should not in my opinion, give rise to any presumption that
the impartiality principle embodied in the Equal Protection Clause has been violated.
Id. at 409-10.
"I For a somewhat different assessment of the possibility of a stable alignment in favor of intermediate scrutiny, see Comment, GenderDiscrimination.Males'FourteenthAmendment Right
to Admission to Female Nursing Program, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 145 (1983).

"1 102 S. Ct. at 3338 (1983).
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higher education for the academically disenfranchised."u The evidence indicates that MUW was neither founded as an institution designed to compensate women for past discrimination, nor did it evolve into one. Its mission
was to educate women in a traditional woman's career. Yet other women's
schools play very different roles. If the relevant question is whether a school
enhances or curtails equality, then each school must be evaluated on the
basis of empirical evidence making a blanket rule inappropriate.
One comment made in Hogan gives pause. Justice O'Connor suggests
that even a demonstration of past discrimination and current benefit may not
be sufficient to justify a gender specific policy. To be constitutionally unobjectionable, -it must have been consciously undertaken:
Even were we to assume that discrimination against women affects their opportunity to obtain an education or to obtain leadership roles in nursing, the
challenged policy nonetheless would be invalid, for the State has failed to
establish that the legislature intended the single-sex policy to compensate for
any perceived discrimination.m
If the Court intends not only to require that the single-sex policy be
beneficial, but that it be consciously undertaken, many single-sex schools may
be unable to continue. Missions evolve, and while many women's schools
were designed to provide women with advantages that could not be obtained
elsewhere, others may have come to do so only more recently.
In sum, with the statutory support and the constitutionality of even
public single-sex education still unresolved, there is certainly no basis for the
IRS at present to deny tax exemptions to private schools that maintain such
policies. I turn now to the question of whether in the future the Court should
disallow state support of women's schools, either directly or through tax
benefits. It is my position that such a holding would at this time in history
adversely affect equality between men and women.
III.

SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION: BURDEN OR BENEFIT?

This section looks more closely at the case against single-sex education
for women, and examines the premises underlying this case. It is concluded
that opponents of single-sex education have not demonstrated that women
have been disadvantaged when they are allowed to maintain institutions
restricted to their own gender. It is further concluded that there is sufficient
reason to allow the continuation of some single-sex schools as an educational
option whether or not the reintroduced Equal Rights Amendment is eventually ratified.
Id. at 3338 n.13.

'

Id. at 3339 n.16. See, Note The End of an Erafor Single-Sex Schools? Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 15 CONN. L. R.v. 353.
2
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The argument against single-sex education generally begins with a
discussion of the parallels in the position of blacks and women. Women, like
blacks, have long been subjected to social and legal discrimination; like
blacks, they remain politically disadvantaged; like blacks, individuals are
classified on the basis of a characteristic over which they have no control and
which is for the most part inescapable; and like blacks, they have been traditionally viewed as inferior." The parallels persist when one examines educational policy. Just as separate educational facilities for blacks and whites
were prompted by prejudice and the desire to keep blacks in their inferior
position, separate educational facilities for women were similarly motivated.
As Cynthia Lewis asserted:
Sex segregated education, like racial segregation, did not represent a genuine
attempt to guarantee equality. Just as improvements in the legal status of
blacks prompted the development of separate but equal doctrine in the field of
race, an improvement in the status of women, i.e., the recognition by some
that women could and should be educated, prompted the development of
separate schools for women. Women could no longer be denied an education
but they could be denied coeducational learning. It is highly unlikely that
females would have been educated separately from males had there not been
prejudice against and sterotypical notions about women."
Further, just as there has never been symmetry of treatment for blacks,
facilities for women have not been equal to those of men." 6 Women's institutions have been inferior even when only tangible facilities are measured. In a
1973 study, Alan Sorkin compared women's colleges to coeducational institutions with respect to a number of variables associated with the quality of an
institution. These factors included percentage of the faculty with a Ph.D.,
number of library books per student, student-faculty ratio, faculty salaries
and expenditures per student. Distinctions were made between public and
private institutions and among categories based on selectivity of the student
body. It was found that the women's colleges had fewer resources than the
men's colleges and the coeducational institutionsY7 It is further argued that
even if the facilities are not obviously inferior but merely different, singlesex education is against women's interests because it allows for evasions.

M Comment, supra note 6, at 594. See also, Note, The Constitutionality of the Single-Sex
Public School-Separate But Equal? Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, 9 CoNN. L.
REV. 151 [hereinafter cited as Note]; Shaman, College Admission PoliciesBased on Sex and the
Equal Protection Clause, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 609 (1970-71) [hereinafter cited as Shaman].
" Comment, supra note 6, at 559; see also Shaman, supra note 124, at 613.
M Comment, supra note 6, at 611; see also Case Development, Sex-segregated Public
Schools: Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia and the JudicialDefinition of an Equal
Education for Women, 4 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 79, 88 (1978).
127 Sorkin, Women's Colleges and Universities: A Qualitative Assessment, COLL. AND U. 92
(Winter, 1973); See also Harris, The Second Sex in Academe, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL. 283, 293-94 (d970);
Shaman, supra note 124, at 614.
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Since schools are not identical, some judgment must be made as to the importance of specific differences. Judges' sensitivity to sex discrimination will affect their assessments, and there is a risk that insensitive or biased judges
will, if given discretion, perpetuate situations which disadvantage women. To
illustrate the danger, opponents of single-sex education cite Vorchheimer. No
real effort was made here to weigh the importance of intangible factors. In
addition, the admittedly unequal science facilities were not viewed as sufficiently important to produce unequal schools.1"
Thus, the argument goes, blacks and women have faced strikingly similar
conditions. It is therefore likely that if, as the Supreme Court found in Brown
v. Board of Education,"'racial segregation adversely affects the self-image of
black children, sex segregation will have the same effects on females. Separation in each case conveys a stigma and perpetuates stereotypes. 3 ' The argument extends beyond the condemnation of forced separation of a minority by
the majority. Opponents of single-sex education usually take the position that
all separation is bad, whether or not voluntary, and that all gender classifications should be declared unlawful. The reasoning is that gender classifications implicitly reinforce stereotypes about women, and that such
stereotypes inhibit the achievement of equality. The argument is akin to the
color-blind branch of the fourteenth amendment equal protection theory." 1 It
is not necessary to oppose all gender classifications in order to conclude that
single-sex education is unconstitutional. Even if it is conceded that some
gender classifications are to be permitted, these must be subject to at least
intermediate scrutiny which would require a demonstration that the
classifications are substantially related to an important government interest.
If single-sex education is subjected to such scrutiny, it will fail since there is
no such relationship.
Some opponents of single-sex education thus are led to a need to discredit
the proposition that women may benefit from attending single-sex schools,
since demonstration of such a benefit might lead to a legitimate societal, and
hence governmental, interest in preserving this type of educational option. A
prime target has been a 1973 study by Elizabeth Tidball. Tidball examined
the educational backgrounds of successful women by selecting at random
1,500 women in equal numbers from three editions of Who's Who of
"2The fear that the separate but equal doctrine sometimes allows judges to escape
serious consideration of allegations of deprivation may have been realized in the
Vorchheimer case itself. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals glossed over
the acknowledged fact that the science facilities at Central High School are superior to
those at Girls' High, and therefore are not absolutely equal.
Comment, supra note 6, at 610 n.82.
2' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" See Shaman, supra note 124, at 613; Note, supra note 124, at 163; Comment, supra note 6,
at 621, 622 n.82.
131 Comment, supra note 6, at 621, 622 n.82.
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American Women. She found that twice as many of these women had attended women's colleges as had gone to coeducational institutions. On the basis of
this data, she concluded that single-sex education promoted achievement,
both by eliminating male distractions and also by providing role models for
women. 3 ' This study has been faulted on many grounds. The women who attended women's colleges may have started out more talented than the
women who attended coeducational institutions. This was in fact likely, since
until recently often the only colleges open to women were single-sex
schools.'" Second, Tidball did not control for socio-economic background, and
yet the correlation between socio-economic background and career success
may be significantly higher than the influence of the particular college attended. It is certainly likely that the "more prestigious, and expensive
women's colleges are more likely to attract students of high socio-economic
status and strong career orientations."" A third criticism is that Who's Who
in American Women does not measure success in American society but only
success relative to other women." The role model hypothesis is also flawed,
since men dominate women's institutions. This is particularly true at the
higher ranks. Statistics for the 1974-75 academic year reveal that of the
13 colleges, only Barnard and Wellesley had faculties in which
seven "sister""
women made up more than half of the total.'37
Finally, opponents of single-sex education point out that the real world is
populated by both sexes, and women will not be equal until they learn to
operate effectively within it. This is a lesson they are more likely to learn in
a coeducational institution."8 Much of the material in support of this position
comes from anecdotal statements of women who felt their own experiences in
women's colleges had been unrealistic."9

12 Tidbal, Perspectives on Academic Women and Affirmative Action, 54 EDUC. REC. 130
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Tidball].
'' Comment, supra note 6, at 638-39.
"I'Id. See also BAKER, supra note 6, at 156.
135Id.

Bryn Mawr, Barnard, Smith, Mount Holyoke, Wellesley, Radcliffe and Vassar.
1 Comment, supra note 6, at 640.

Id. See also Shaman, supra, note 124, at 621-22.
WsBAKER, supra note 6. The thrust of Baker's book is that women's colleges have failed
because they have reflected society rather than changed it, and therefore have not done nearly
enough for women's equality. For example, Baker remarks at 145, "Of the forty-nine presidents (or
deans in the early days of Barnard and Radcliffe), the ratio of men and women has not been so lopsided as might be expected in institutions committed to the education of women: twenty-one men
to twenty-eight women." However this ratio is significantly different than that for coeducational
institutions. Data from 1981 indicates that "67% of all women's college presidents are women,
compared to 8% nationally." Profile II, supra note 1. Baker also quotes women who felt the colleges failed them. However, one can certainly find many women whose experiences were positive.
See, e.g., Stimpson, Women at Bryn Mawr, 6 CHANGE 25 (1974). It is of course difficult to draw
any meaningful conclusions from anectodal data.
'

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

The arguments against single-sex education as summarized above are far
from conclusive, and may be questioned on many grounds. Before proceeding,
it is essential to restate what is at issue. I have no quarrel with the view that
forced separation of women, a societal minority group despite their numbers,
violates the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause even as it is now
interpreted, and would surely violate the Equal Rights Amendment were it
to be ratified. My concern is with the question of whether women should be
allowed to attend single-sex institutions voluntarily, as one educational option. With the parameters established, I shall turn to an evaluation of the
arguments previously presented.
Drawing a parallel between women and blacks is appropriate if the purpose is to indicate that a classification which could be used to injure a group
should be strictly scrutinized. It may not be appropriate when determining
whether a particular action is benign because the situation for blacks and
women, while similar, is not identical. Even Gunnar Myrdal, who pointed out
many parallels between women and blacks, noted that "[w]oman was elevated
as an ornament and looked upon with pride, while the Negro slave became increasingly a chattel and a ward.""0 Women live in close association with men
and are evenly distributed in all social classes."' In short, they have enjoyed
a higher status than blacks. Further, the intimidation which they have faced
is.quite different from that encountered by blacks. When blacks have attempted to exercise rights, they have often been physically and economically abused. For females, fear of rejection has a greater reality than fear of physical
violence. Thus, the very intangible factors that may result in damage from
forced racial segregation may lead to the opposite result in sex segregation.
For example, assertiveness, independence, and competitiveness have been
traditionally viewed as unfeminine,' and there is considerable evidence to
suggest that many women respond either with anxiety or with appropriately
conforming behavior which negatively affects achievement."' Margaret Mead
made the point clearly when she stated: "Each step forward as a successful
American regardless of sex means a step back as a woman.""' There is little
to suggest that women's liberation has changed this."' In contrast, blacks
G. MYRDAL, AN AMERIcAN DILEMMA at 1073 (1944).

Murray, Economic and EducationalInequality Based on Sex: An Overview, 5 VAL. U.L.
REV. 237 (1971).
1"2See Homer, Toward an Understandingof Achievement-Related Conflicts in Women, 28 J.
SOCIAL ISSUES 157 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Horner].
243 Id.

'"M. MEAD, MALE AND
145

FEMALE (1949),

cited in Homer, supra note 142.

Homer reports:

A review of the results of the several studies carried on over the past few years ...
substantiates the idea that despite the emphasis on a new freedom for women, particularly since the mid-sixties, negative attitudes expressed toward and about successful
women have remained high and perhaps even increased and intensified among both
male and female subjects.
Horner, supra note 142, at 159.
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need not fear success. With respect to education specifically, it should be
remembered that the original Brown decision did not preclude voluntary
segregation if sought by blacks. Fourteen years later, the Court held that
voluntary separation was too suspect to be tenable14 since violence, psychological and physical, precluded blacks from exercising real choice. As
noted above, however, women are not in the same situation.
To question the analogy between women and blacks is not to prove that
single-sex education is desirable. It does suggest that there are differences in
the factors that affect black and female school performance, and one should
not automatically draw conclusions about one group from experiences with
the other. As I have argued elsewhere, moreover, the constitutional standard
for a gender classification which does not disadvantage women and which
does not allocate a scarce resource should be strict rationality rather than a
compelling or important state interest, whether under the fourteenth amendment or the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.4 7 The central issue must
therefore be the actual impact of single-sex education upon the involved
students.
The consequences of any educational environment are not easy to
measure. It is difficult even to define the goals of schools. The promotion of
achievement in society is often used as a yardstick. Several studies, notably
1' Astin,"I Kistiakowsky, 1 °
those of Tidball, 48
1 Oates and Williamson, 15' and
6
Brown ' have attempted to demonstrate the linkage between educational environment and achievement or career choice. Yet, promotion of career
achievement, though certainly important, is actually only one of several
possible objectives of an educational system. If is difficult, however, to apply
educational or psychological research studies in other areas directly to the
question of whether single-sex education harms or benefits women students.
Even when career achievement is used as an outcome measure, educators
have difficulty agreeing how best to define and measure this parameter, and
how to correlate results with different educational variables. Studies which
include convincing controls are often very difficult to design. For example, a
finding that women who attend single-sex institutions are more likely to pursue certain careers may indicate that the educational environment influences
. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
14

Dubnoff, supra note 20.

" Tidball, supra note 132; Tidball, Women's Colleges and Women Achievers Revisted, 5
SIGNS 504 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SIGNS]; Tidball, Wellesley Women in Science, 59 WELLESLEY

ALUMNAE 1 (1976).
" A. ASTIN, FouR CRITICAL YEARS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ASTIN].

o Tidball & Kistiakowsky, BaccalaureateOrigins of American Scientists and Scholars, 193
SCIENCE 646 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Tidhall & Kistiakowsky].
' Oates, Women's Colleges and Women Achievers, 3 SIGNS 795 (1978).
1M2 Brown, Career Plans of College Women-Patterns and Influences. Paper Presented
at the
Research Conference on Educational Environments and Undergraduate Women, Wellesley
College, Sept. 13-15, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Brown].
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that outcome. An equally plausible explanation might be that the women who
select those institutions have such career interests and talents prior to their
choice of schools.
Even with all the appropriate caveats, there is evidence which suggests
that single-sex education is not harmful to women, but may even be
significantly beneficial. The results of studies which have directly examined
the impact of educational environment have indicated positive correlations
between attendance at a women's college, and both the achievement and the
selection of nontraditional careers. The 1973 Tidball study provided
preliminary data to this effect, even if it did not prove that single-sex institutions generated the observed effects. The criticism that Tidball used the
wrong yardstick for achievement because she did not compare women with
men is invalid. It is not relevant to the matter at hand that achievement
rates between the sexes might be different in an unequal society. We are interested instead in determining which women are likely to be successful. Tidball also found that women's colleges had higher ratios of female faculties
than coeducational colleges, and suggested that the differences in achievement of graduates reflected the influence of female role models.'53 This
hypothesis remains unproved, but the basic correlation between achievement
and single-sex institutions is independent of this hypothesis.
More recent studies have supported the above observations. A 1976
study done by Tidball and Vera Kistiakowsky compared various baccalaureate institutions with respect to the number and percentage of
graduates who went on to receive doctorates.'" The data for this study was
obtained from the Doctorate Records File, which has the advantage that it is
not biased by criteria of selection that may exclude some recipients. The sample of institutions finally selected contained 137 colleges and universities.
These were stratified according to various criteria and ranked according to
the number and percentage of doctoral recipients produced. "Twelve institutions, eight that admitted women only and four universities, appear in the
top 25 with respect both to the number and to the percentage of their women
graduates who subsequently obtained doctorates."'5 5 When it is recognized
that the coeducational colleges are approximately five times as numerous as
women's colleges 1 the reported figures show a strong correlation between
attendance at a women's college and receipt of a doctoral degree. The study
also compared the productivity of different institutions within fields. The
data obtained confirmed the findings of earlier researchers 57 that women
who attend single-sex institutions are more likely to study and pursue a
'

Tidball, supra note 132.
" Tidball & Kistiakowsky, supra note 150 at 651.

" Id. at 649.
15 Id.

z M. NEWCOMER, A CENTURY OF HIGH EDUCATION FOR WOMEN (1959).
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career in nontraditional 58' fields than are those who attend coeducational colleges. "Nine of the 24 institutions with the highest percentages of women
who subsequently received doctorates in the physical sciences and engineering are women's colleges." '59 A still more recent article by Tidbal... specifically addressed some of the objections raised to her earlier assertions. As
already noted, some critics had argued that the positive correlations between
achievement and attendance at a women's college had little significance since
women have not been able to attend coeducational institutions in significant
numbers. The data indicate, however, that since 1910, women had ample opportunity to attend coeducational institutions, and in fact, many more of
them graduated from such institutions than from women's colleges. In 1918,
11,000 women graduated from coeducational institutions compared with 4,500
from women's colleges; in 1932, the figures were 36,000 to 7,300.11 Even more
interesting is the comparison in productivity of schools of equal selectivity.
The data indicated that "the highly selective women's colleges were twice as
productive of achievers as were the highly selective coeducational colleges.
Similarly, all other women's colleges were twice as likely to have produced
achievers as were all other coeducational colleges."'62 These differences could
not be explained by differences in academic expenditures.
In 1966, the American Council on Education initiated a long term study,
the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP), to examine questions of college impact. Some of the data developed in this study have direct
relevance to the question of the effects of single-sex education. Two analyses
drawn from this data are of particular interest. The first is Alexander Astin's
evaluation based on the first ten years of the study."3 Astin traced attitudinal changes within the four-year college experience, examining the effects of a number of variables. His findings were that attendance at a
women's college positively affects the development of self-esteem, high
aspirations and leadership potential.' Such effects are not only positive in
themselves but might account for later differences in achievement reported
in other studies.
Relying on the same data base as Astin, Marsha Brown used multivariate
regression analysis to assess the affects on career choices of a number of
potential factors.""' The variables examined, in addition to college environment, included parental income, high school achievement, religion, marital
' Traditional fields for women have been education and the humanities.

' Tidball & Kistiakowsky, supra note 150.
IC

SIGNS, supra note 148.

Id. at 507.
...
Id. at 512.
"C

ASTIN, supra note 149.

' Id. at 232-35, 246.
"CBrown, supra note 152.
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status, self-esteem, attitudes, and previous career plans, among others. The
results indicated positive influences of women's colleges in certain time
periods. Selective women's colleges positively affected within four and five
years of enrollment, the career plan of women who entered college with
BA/MA plans. Selective and unselective sectarian women's colleges had a
positive influence on application to. graduate school and "unselective sectarian women's colleges ha[d] a positive effect on enrollment in graduate
school.""' There was no indication from the data that women's colleges were
detrimental to achievement.
More recent studies also bear out the correlation between educational
background and career choice. Marvin Bressler and Peter Wendell"' studied
the differences in career choice of men and women attending comparable
single-sex and coeducational institutions on career ambition and achievement.
They reported that both male and female white, middle-class, academically
capable individuals were more likely to follow non-sex stereotyped occupational choices if they attended single-sex schools. Linda Lenz found a positive
correlation between attendance at single-sex schools and career success.",
There has also- been research which indicates a correlation between
single-sex education and choice of subject. Girls who attend single-sex secondary schools are more likely to choose science or mathematics than are girls
who attend coeducational institutions. Research by M.B. Ormerod illustrates
the point. His examination of the subject preferences and subject choices of
1,204 pupils in nineteen secondary schools in England and Wales concludes
that subject choices in coeducational schools were more affected by sex
16 9
stereotypes than were choices in single-sex schools.
Less direct, but nonetheless relevant, are some of the theories of motivation developed by psychologists. These studies include work on sex
stereotypes, women's conflicts stemming from achievement, and linkage of
self-esteem and success. It has long been recognized that certain types of
behavior are identified with one or the other of the sexes. Educators have
observed that boys and girls behave differently as they progress through
school. As boys get older their motivation increases; for girls maturation has
1" Id. at 6.
167 Bressler & Wendell, The Sex Composition of Selective Colleges and Gender Differences
in CareerAspirations, 51 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 50 (1980).
1' Lentz, An Analysis of the Effects of Four Years of Attendance at a Women's or Coeducational College on Women's Career Salience. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Educational Research Association (Apr. 10, 1980).
188Ormerod, Subject Preference and Choice in Co-educational and Single-Sex Secondary
Schools, 45 BRIT. J. OF EDUC.PSYCHOLOGY 257 (1975). It certainly could be argued that this study is
not relevant since British and American experiences differ. This is a debatable point, but in my
view the societies are not fundamentally different, and the implictions of the results of the study
are still meaningful.
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the opposite effect. 10 Some psychologists have looked at sex stereotypes for
an explanation. Competitiveness, aggression, independence and intellectual
leadership have been traditionally viewed as masculine, the opposite
characteristics as feminine. 171 Drawing from what is known about the process
by which boys and girls develop a perception about what behavior is acceptable, it is not unreasonable to assume these perceptions will have behavioral
effects later on. A strong determinant of sex role identity is that sexappropriate behavior is rewarded and sex-inappropriate behavior is punished. Early in life, it is generally the parents who provide the cues; later, peers
may serve the same function. Thus, if it is true that competence and intellectual leadership are viewed as unfeminine, women who exhibit these tendencies may become anxious, or may suppress their career motivations. The
research of Matina Horner is particularly interesting in this respect. Horner
posited the existence of widespread avoidance of success, and noted that "the
presence of a motive to avoid success ... implies that the expression of the
achievement-directed tendencies of most otherwise positively motivated
young women is inhibited by the arousal of a thwarting disposition to be anxious about the negative consequences they expect will follow the desired success."'7' This fear was generated by perceived conflicts between the goals of
feminity and achievement. The views of male peers were found to have clear
impact on female behavior. As had been hypothesized, competitive situations
aroused the fear with the result that "young women, especially those high in
the motive to avoid success, would be least likely to develop their interests
and explore their intellectual potential when competing against others,
especially against men."' 73 Horner also indicated that there is evidence that
the women's movement has not succeeded in eliminating stereotypical thinking. In fact, "despite the emphasis on a new freedom for women, particularly
since the mid-Sixties, negative attitudes expressed toward and about successful women have remained high and perhaps even increased and intensified among both male and female subjects.."' 74 Thus it is unlikely that the
concern for equality has weakened the existence of the motive to avoid success.
1To
C.

R. BARNETT & G. BARUCH, BEYOND SUGAR AND SPICE, How WOMEN GROw, LEARN
at 220-21 (1979) (citing the findings of the Carnegie Commission on Higher

RIVERS,

AND THRIVE,

Education).
supra note 142.
Id. at 159.
"I Id. at 165. The thesis that women are ambivalent about success and that this ambivalence
affects their behavior has been widely researched. While there has been considerable support for
Horner's findings, there has also been criticism. See Anderson, Motive to Avoid Success: A Profile, 4 SEx ROLES 239 (1978), for a discussion of some of the literature. See also Condry and Dyer
"' Horner,
172

Behavioral and FantasyMeasures of Fear of Success in Children, 48 CHILD DEV. 1417 (1977) for
support for the thesis that girls are affected by a fear of success and that this fear increases as
they get older.
"' Horner, supra note 142, at 159.
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Other research confirms the correlation between fear of success and performance in mixed sex competition."' Some researchers have questioned
Horner's psychological construct. According to Condry and Dyer, "Horner's
concept seems not to represent a fear of success but rather a fear of the
negative consequences incumbent upon deviating from traditional sex-role
standards in certain situations.For women, the negative consequence that is
' The behavioral consequences
probably feared most is male punishment."176
are the same whether one is talking about a "fear of success," as Homer
postulates, or a "fear of social rejection," as Condry and Dyer have described.
Moreover, the fact that there is a basis to female fear of rejection that "they
' reinforces the imare simply demonstrating a clear perception of reality,"177
portance to be derived from a supportive environment.
The fact that some women have difficulties when placed in competitive
situations does not automatically speak for an educational system which
reduces this competition. Indeed, as noted earlier, some opponents of singlesex education argue that women will ultimately benefit from forced exposure
' However, if one accepts the proposition that adequate
to the "real world."178
self-esteem is a precondition of happiness, it is not unreasonable to value a
temporary environment for some young women which might promote a more
positive self-image at a very vulnerable time, and which might thereby better
prepare them to face competitive realities later. The point was well stated by
Patricia McCarty:
Women who desire a rigorous experience and who are capable of taking the
pressure, can now attend Harvard and Yale, especially when these schools are
under pressure to enroll more women. But many college women need and
desire a different kind of experience ... in order to counteract the negative

conditioning of 18 years, young women urgently need four years of dedication
to their intellectual and personal development in an atmosphere of positive
reenforcement and respect."9
IV.

ERA AND THE STATUS OF GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS: A REASSESSMENT

The Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified, would guarantee "equality of
rights under the law" to both sexes. Its broad purpose is to promote equality
between men and women in society. The same goal underlies heightened
175 Condry & Dyer, Fearof Success: Attribution of Cause to the Victim, 32 J. Soc. ISSUES 63
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Condry & Dyer]; L. Peplau, The Impact of Fear of Success, Sex-role Attitudes, and Opposite-Sex Relationships on Women's Intellectual Performance: An Experimental
Study of Competition in Dating Couples (1973) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard
University).
17 Condry & Dyer, supra note 175, at 75.
177

Id.

...
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
179McCarty, A New Perspective on Women's Colleges, NATIONAL Assoc. OF WOMEN'S DEANS
AND COUNSELORS (Winter 1977).
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scrutiny of gender classifications under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. As the discussion of single-sex education
demonstrates, there may well be a conflict between a blanket prohibition
against gender classifications and the achievement of gender equality. Consequently, before reading ERA as making all such classifications impermissible,
we should examine whether such a rule is the best way to cure the inequalities to which ERA is directed. If it is not, a blanket rule should be abandoned in favor of a more workable approach.
There is nothing in the language of the Equal Rights Amendment that requires barring all gender classifications. To restate, what is required is
equality of rights. How this is to be achieved is open to question, but we are
not without some experience as to how to proceed. It is a situation quite
similar to the one posed by racial classifications under the equal protection
clause and it is, therefore, appropriate to draw from the experience of the
constitutional treatment of racial classifications under that constitutional
provision. There is a school of thought which holds that the effect of the fourteenth amendment is to create a "color-blind" constitution. The extreme
statement of this position is that racial classifications should simply be impermissible. This view has substantial support in the legal commentary and
even more in public opinion.'8 0 In practice, this means that all racial classifications should automatically trigger strict scrutiny. Justice Rehnquist adheres
to this view.' Justice Powell seems to come close. ' I shall begin by examining the underpinnings of this position.
One argument offered in support of a color-blind interpretation is that
this principle is neutral and limits court activism. There is no way to
establish an objective principle to assess harm. In arguing against preferential policies, Richard Posner writes,
The exception is inadmissible, because it requires the court not only to consider whether there is discrimination but to decide whether the discrimination
harms or hurts a particular racial group, and to weigh the competing claims of
different racial groups, and the additional inquiries rob the principle of its
precision and objectivity.'
It is also argued that it is impossible to determine when race may be used in
" See, e.g., Graglia, Special Admission of the "CulturallyDeprived" to Law School, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 351 (1970); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionalityof PreferentialTreatment of RacialMinorities, (1974) Sup. CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter cited as Posner]; Kitch, The Return
of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 1;
Blackstone, Reverse Discriminationand Compensatory Justice, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 52 (1977).
Ill See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
18 Justice Powell, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), argued that all
racial classifications should be viewed as suspect, although the application of this rule is somewhat
distinct, as discussed in the text.

M,Posner, supra note 180.
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a benign fashion. Its use to give preference may in fact stigmatize the group
to whom the preference is accorded. Others will consider the special treatment as indicating the inferiority of the involved group. Furthermore, special
treatment generates resentment, and may also reinforce stereotypes. Thus,
it is contended that the courts lack a way to distinguish between burdens and
benefits of a particular classification and hence should not try.'
Implicit in these arguments is a concern regarding the legitimacy of
court intervention to review legislative judgments. Anxiety about the
undemocratic character of judicial review fosters the search for clear principles that can justify an exercise of power by the courts, and the color-blind
principle seems to provide one. The arguments for a color-blind interpretation are likewise directed toward issues of judicial role and competence. 8' A
rule that race is a prohibited classification is obviously clearer than one that
requires judgment concerning the classification's impact. This suggests yet
another advantage; permissible and impermissible behavior are known in advance. Finally, it is claimed that the color-blind interpretation is fairer. Just
as it was in the past inequitable to deny minorities benefits on the basis of
race, it is unfair to favor them today.
The same arguments are used to defend the elimination of all references
to gender. Particular concern is expressed about the Court's capacity to
assess consequences since its past performance indicates that it is even less
equipped to judge impact where gender is concerned than where a racial
classification is at issue. As Nancy Gertner accurately pointed out recently,
[Tihere is the conceptual problem of distinguishing paternalistic classifications
which stereotype women from "benign" affirmative action classifications ....
The root of the difficulty lies in the fact that discrimination against women
has always been ostensibly benign, done in the guise of protecting women,
compensating for their physical frailties or making allowance for their special
contributions to society."
This common rationale may increase the difficulty in determining when a

1'4 See, e.g., Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro- The Prob.
lem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966).
"8The issue of judicial role stems from the concern that decision-making by appointed lifetenured judges is contrary to the basic tenets of democratic government. The adoption of clear cut
principles could minimize potential conflict both by providing a justification for court action and
by limiting the injection of judicial preference. The current efforts in that direction owe much to
Herbert Wechsler. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959).
185 Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action for Women: Pedestal or Cage? 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 173, 180-82 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Gertner]. Gertner does not take the position,
however, that a blanket prohibition on the use of gender must be instituted. See also L.

KANowITz, EQUAL RIGHTS: THE MALE STAxE 36-42 (1981); Johnson, Sex Discriminationand the

Supreme Court 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 670 (1974).
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gender classification is truly benign and when in fact it works against
women's interests.
For the most part, the parallel between racial and gender classifications
is apt. There has been widespread de jure discrimination against women that
has left them in an inferior position -economically, politically, and socially. 87
In judging whether a gender-blind interpretation of either the Equal Rights
Amendment or the equal protection clause is appropriate, we should look
more closely at the color-blind interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
The most serious problem with the color-blind approach is that it would leave
many of the effects of past discrimination in place. This is particularly apparent when the complex and extensive linkage between past discrimination
and current disadvantage is recognized.188 Negative attitudes toward blacks
led to discrimination in employment and housing. Racial discrimination in
employment consigned blacks to lower paying jobs. Discrimination is
perpetuated even after the opening of employment opportunities by seniority
systems based on the "last hired, last fired" principle, and by "subjective promotional criteria, evaluated primarily by white supervisory personnel" who
may use "consciously or unconsciously biased decisionmaking.' 89 It is not uncommon to recruit employees informally, further advantaging those already
employed. As Duncan pointed out, "it is all too common for employers to rely
on their white male work force to do word-of-mouth recruitment, thereby effectively excluding minority applicants." '' Inequalities in employment can
also lead to inequalities in housing which perpetuate inequalities in education. How this complex mix of disadvantage can be corrected without affirmative action is unclear. 9'
The Supreme Court has reluctantly come to accept this position. There
11 This point has been developed more fully elsewhere. See, e.g., B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H.
KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1977); K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEXBASED DISCRIMINATION (1974); DECKARD, THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: POLITICAL SOCIOECONOMIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES (1979).
'" Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action" A Jurisprudential/LegalCritique, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Duncan].
,8 Id. at 513.
Id. at 518.
131 The literature on both sides of this issue is extensive. What follows is a sampling of this
material. For articles opposing affirmative action, see supra note 180. For articles supporting affirmative action, see Duncan, supra note 188. See also Bell, In Defense of Minority Admissions
Programs:A Response to Professor Graglia,119 U. PA. L. REV. 364 (1979); Fiss, Groups and the
Equal ProtectionClause, 5 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 105 (1976); Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse
Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Ginger, Who Needs Affirmative Action, 14
HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 265 (1979); Karst, Forward.Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case
of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19 (1979); Perry, Modern Equal Protection:A Conceptualization and Appraisal,79 CoLu . L. REV. (1979); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment, 24 U.C.L.A. REV. 581 (1977); E. DORN, RULES AND RACIAL EQUALITY (1979).
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was a time when it appeared that no legal distinctions based on race would
be allowed. Those who argue for a color-blind interpretation point to a series
93
of decisions from Korematsu v. United States" through Loving v. Virginia,
in which the idea of race as a suspect classification was developed.19 In fact,
however, strict scrutiny was the standard only for part of the Court's
history. Since the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has
taken three different approaches to racial classifications. Early case law
upheld discriminations we no longer consider constitutional. Cases from the
1940s to the early 1970s adopted the standard of strict scrutiny. While the
language in these cases strongly suggests that racial classifications are impermissible, it is essential to note that they all involved classifications which
clearly burdened racial minorities.19 The Court was not asked in these cases
to confront the question of whether classifications that might benefit
minorities could be acceptable. Likewise, the cases outlawing segregation
have also been said to rest on the premise that all racial classifications are
impermissible." 6 It is clear, however, that the segregation laws were aimed
at disadvantaging blacks. In sum, these cases do not prove that all racial
classifications must meet a strict scrutiny standard of review.
More recently, the Court has in other circumstances accepted and
sometimes required racial classifications. One line of precedents involves the
establishment of race-conscious remedies for past discriminations. In Swann
v. Charlotte-MecklenbergBoard of Education," the Supreme Court upheld
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
'u In Korematsu, which validated a particularly invidious discrimination against a racial
group, Justice Black wrote: "It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that the courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny." 323 U.S. at 216. There are three cases that provide further support for the color-blind
proposition: Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); and
'9
"

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Bolling, the Court, in ruling against school segregation in
the District of Columbia said, "Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." 347 U.S.
at 499. That position finds further support in Justice White's opinion for the Court in McLaughlin.
He wrote, "This strong policy renders racial classifications constitutionally suspect and subject to
the 'most rigid scrutiny' and 'in most cases irrelevant' to any constitutionally acceptable
legislative purpose." 379 U.S. at 192. Finally, in ending miscegenation laws, the Court wrote, "At

the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications ... be subject to
the 'most rigid scrutiny' and if they are ever upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective." 388 U.S. at 11.
M"See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statutory scheme to prevent interracial
marriages held to violate the equal protection and the due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment).
'" See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (segregation of Negro school children, even
if they are provided equal facilities, imposes upon the student a burden constituting an arbitrary

denial of fifth amendment due process rights).
19 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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the use of racial criteria in making school assignments to eliminate segregation. There is dicta in the opinion to the effect that even voluntary raceconscious remedies would be allowable.' 09 The necessity of race-consciousness
in some circumstances was described by Chief Justice Burger in North
CarolinaBoard of Education v. Swann.' In the course of invalidating a state
statute that prohibited the use of race in making school assignments, Chief
Justice Burger wrote that a requirement mandating color-blindness "against
the background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of
Brown."' Similarly, the Court has upheld the use of racial criteria to remedy
past discriminatory practices in employment. ' It has also allowed race to be
taken into account in the drawing of legislative districts when such action is
taken in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965."2 Most recently, the
Court has allowed Congress to fashion remedies for past discrimination that
are race-specific,0 ' and there is some indication that some race-specific action
that is seen as benign will also be allowed in other settings."4 In sum, most
justices today will admit that race-consciousness is at least necessary in
order to assess the extent of compliance, and is also acceptable in styling
remedies to direct violations.0 2 Justice Blackmun stated, "I yield to no one in
my earnest hope that the time will come when an 'affirmative action' program is unnecessary, and is, in truth, only a relic of the past ....
At some
time, the United States must and will reach a stage of maturity where action
2 6
along this line is no longer necessary.""
In short, the actual experience of
the Court in evaluating racial classifications provides compelling evidence
that, for the present at least, the elimination of all racial classifications would
not serve the goals of racial equality.

"' Chief Justice Burger, in noting that the remedial powers of federal courts were limited to
situations in which a constitutional violation had been proven, remarked that the school
authorities had greater power to institute race conscious remedies:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole, to do this
as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.
Id. at 16.
402 U.S. 43 (1971).
Id. at 45-46 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
"' See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); International Bd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
"' Five Justices, Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White, in Bakke indicated that
some race consciousness in university admissions was allowable. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
I" Swann was a unanimous decision, and all but Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and
O'Connor participated. Powell indicated some willingness to allow race conscious remedies in
Bakke and in Fullilove.
1 438 U.S. at 404.
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Again, the justification for gender-conscious action to equalize opportunities for women parallels those used to support attention to race, for it can
certainly be argued that complete gender neutrality will be unlikely to
remedy past sex discrimination. Remedial classifications would, therefore, be
fully consistent with "equality of rights under the law." Even some who have
claimed that ERA implies gender blindness admit that
[a]uthority to remedy the effects of past discriminations as well as to implement
the provisions of the Equal Rights Amendment in available and unquestioned.
Thus the courts have power to grant affirmative relief in framing decrees in
particular cases. As in racial desegregation cases, such decrees could provide
remedies for past denial of equal rights which take into account sex factors
and give special treatment to the group discriminated against. Similar
remedial measures, on a broader scale, could also be the subject of legislative
action. This form of affirmative action may appear, paradoxically to conflict
with the absolute nature of the Equal Rights Amendment. But where damage
has been done by a violator who acts on the basis of a forbidden characteristic,
the enforcing authorities may also be compelled to take the same
characteristic into account in order to undo what has been done. This form of
relief is a common feature of laws seeking to eliminate discrimination,
whether the restriction imposed be absolute or not.m
Some gender-consciousness may advance equality even when not narrowly compensatory. Attention to gender may compensate for past stereotyping
that has limited job opportunities for women. It may prevent gender-neutral
actions from perpetuating past discrimination. Some gender-specific action
2 8
may "[increase] women's access to new social roles.""
As has been discussed
in a prior section, there is evidence that single-sex education may have that
effect. While permitting gender distinctions often involves placing the interests of one of the sexes over that of the other, this is not always the case.
Again the example of single-sex education is illustrative. Since postsecondary educational facilities do not generally represent a scarce resource,
males will probably not suffer a significant injury by being excluded from a
relatively small number of schools with females-only admissions policies. Explicit consideration of gender may be clearly neutral in effect. Surely singlesex bathrooms and sleeping areas do not carry the same negative connotations that separate racial facilities do.
To say that the Court has not done well in distinguishing burdensome
from nonburdensome classification is not to say that it should not try in the
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment. A Constitutional
Basisfor Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 904 (1971). The acceptance, however reluctantly, of at least some gender classifications is sometimes in vacillation. Compare Ginsburg,
Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving American Ideal, 6 HuM. RTS. 1 (1977), with R.
GINSBURG, REALIZING THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT:
WOMEN AND RACIAL MINORITIES IN EDUCATION AND BUSINESS (1977).

Gertner, supra note 186, at 209.
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future. These judgments are no more exacting than other assessments that
courts are called upon to make.2 I have discussed elsewhere several criteria
for assessing burden. In brief form, essential characteristics of burdensome
classifications include discriminatory intent, restriction of privileges, limitations of rights or responsibilities, imposition of tangible burdens such as
economic disadvantages or harsher punishments for wrongdoing, and the imposition of intangible harm in the form of stigma, negative assessments of
capabilities, or role stereotyping.210
In sum, neither ERA nor the equal protection clause compels the elimination of all gender classifications. Writing just before the first effort at ERA
ratification failed, Paul Brest commented, "If it had been adopted, it would
obviously have required that gender classifications meet a standard higher
than 'rational classification,' but just what the standard would have been and
'
under what circumstances is not clear."211
What is clear is that a uniformly
applied strict scrutiny standard is ill suited to the achievement of the goal of
equality between men and women in society.
CONCLUSION
In summary, there is considerable evidence that many women's colleges
have exerted a positive influence on equalizing the position of men and
women in society. A denial of tax-exempt status would have a devastating effect on such schools. The holding in Bob Jones"2 does not in itself threaten
this status. Women's schools could, however, be jeopardized either by a determination by Congress or the Supreme Court that single-sex education is
harmful and provides no public benefits, or by a decision by the Court that effectively invalidates all gender classifications by subjecting them to strict
scrutiny, whether under the equal protection clause, or under a ratified
Equal Rights Amendment. It, therefore, becomes important to remember
that empirical data from the social sciences supports the concept that the
preservation of some single-sex schools as an educational option ultimately
benefits society. Furthermore, the value of preserving this benefit offers by
example a persuasive argument in favor of a flexible approach toward gender
classifications. ERA is needed to affirm the commitment of this country to
gender equality, but this commitment does not require the elimination of
possible means of achieving it.
The substantive analysis presented in this Article has some bearing on a
I When the state places a limitation on the time or place of speech, the Court must assess
whether the regulation is reasonable. It has no more obvious criteria to guide it in weighing competing interests in this situation than if it were called upon to asess the impact of a classification in
an equal protection claim.
210 Dubnoff, supra note 20, at 387-90.
1P.
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 622 (1983).
1l2

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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broader question of constitutional interpretation: the place of fixed rules in
adjudication. The appeal of proscribing all gender classifications is clear. Ambiguity is limited, judicial discretion is confined, and there is an appearance of
fairness. But there are pitfalls in establishing too rigid a standard-most
seriously the potential distortion of the underlying objective. A strict prohibition would represent an example of the "absolutist" approach to constitutional adjudication and has all the virtues and defects of this approach, as
discussed by Craig R. Ducat.21 The search for some balance between standardless and mechanical adjudication cuts across doctrinal areas and is at the
core of much constitutional analysis. Without some guiding principle, it is
hard to see how the Court can avoid either total abdication or significant intervention into the legislative process. Yet with too narrow a standard, outcomes may be produced which are inconsistent with desired objectives. The
broad question then is when, if ever, is it better for the Court to proceed on
a case-by-case basis rather than to establish general rules applicable beyond
the immediate case.
The prohibition of specific classifications, whether they be racial,
religious, gender-specific, or age-specific, comes closer to a rule of decision
" ' The Constitution contains some very
than a statement of broad principle.21
specific sections, such as the minimum age requirement for presidents and
the number of senators allowed each state. In the main, however, the Constitution is broadly worded and establishes norms, the specifics of which are
left open. In the words of John Marshall: "It is intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
The Constitution, according to Marshall, must remain flexible:
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future
times, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character
of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have
been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which,
if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided
for as they occur.215
Marshall's observations are no less valid today.
An analysis of situations in which specific rules are appropriate and those
in which they should be avoided leads to several generalizations. First, the
broader and the more complex an issue, the less likely a narrow rule will
equally serve all its ends, and the more likely that changed conditions will require alteration in the means by which the principles are effected. For example, the twenty-fifth amendment provides very specific answers to questions
113
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C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1978).

As Ronald T. Dworkin stated, "[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion."

Dworkin, Is Law A System of Rules?, ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, 37 (1968).
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McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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of presidential succession. Anything else could create a series of unmanageable problems at a time of crisis. In contrast, the ways in which certain practices affect equality are complex and may change with the
circumstances. A second feature that sets the specific provisions of the Constitution apart from the more conceptual is that the former deal with procedural rather than substantive guarantees. They are not the embodiments
of principles in themselves, but serve rather to advance wider objectives. For
example, the procedural guarantees afforded the criminally accused are
designed to assure, insofar as possible, that the innocent are not wrongly convicted, that each individual is treated with dignity, and that the integrity of
government is preserved. The guarantees serve as means to those ends.
ERA embodies a vision-a society in which personal achievements and
goals will no longer be constrained on account of gender. Its purpose is to insure that government, at least, would no longer be able to contribute to inequality. But what is equality of rights? "Equality" and "rights" are both
terms which lend themselves to various interpretations. We know that the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was once narrowly construed as limited only to political rights.21 Clearly, the legislative history of
ERA requires more than this. In fact, its intended scope could not be
broader, involving as it must the entire population and encompassing the entire range of activities in which government is engaged: employment, education, rules of property, family law, law enforcement, and so on. The breadth
of its interest leaves room for those yet to be anticipated. Equality is also a
term of uncertain meaning. Is what is intended equality of treatment? Is it
equality of results? In 1983, "placing men and women on an equal footing"
most often translates into assuring that there should be more freedom for
both men and women in their choice of roles and that they will be treated
equally in these roles. Some recent writing on gender equality seeks a
redirection in the current thinking that "assimilation is the most women can
'
or should ask for."217
The point is not that a particular position should be
adopted but rather that equality is a broad term: notions of equality evolve.
Our experience with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment cautions against fixing the meaning of the term "equality of rights" in
218
the Equal Rights Amendment.
The question of single-sex education illustrates the dangers of replacing a
principle with a specific rule. There is another danger in defining sex
discrimination as simply the use of explicit classifications that distinguish
between males and females. Precisely because it identifies the classification
itself as the manifestation of inequality, this definition increases the chances
"' Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
"2 Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487, 488 (1981).
2" Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1068-69 (1969).
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that the Supreme Court will either not recognize, or will ignore, other more
subtle forms of sex-based action. We have already seen some costs of such a
focus in the Court's treatment of veteran's preference laws219 and in its
holding that classifications by pregnancy status are not true gender
classifications. The promise of equal treatment is as surely compromised if
the Court does not correctly identify the classification as when it
misperceives burden.
It does seem clear that the goal of equality of men and women is not a
narrow one that can be accomplished by the simple tool of eliminating all
references to sex, but the goal should rather be treated as a broad substantive principle whether or not ERA is ratified. Within this larger context
there can remain sufficient flexibility to look empirically at individual situations, and to permit certain classifications, such as single-sex education,
which are felt ultimately to be of societal benefit for both sexes.
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Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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